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POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AS A RELIGION: THE IDOLATRY
OF DEMOCRACY
MAXWELL 0. CHIBUNDU*
"So when they continued asking him, he lifted up himself, and




Prior to September 11, 2001, the demarcating line between the
rational "us" and the irrational "them" wound around the intelligibility
of "nationalism." The "ethno-nationalist" was portrayed as the
modem-day barbarian: the irrational fanatic whose poisonous belief in
the value of national identification must be eradicated if humankind is
to be saved. In the wake of September 11, 2001, "nationalism" is
being valued. In its stead, the religiously driven "Islamist suicide
bomber" has become the poster child of fanaticism.2  A committed
zealot whose mindset reveals the inscrutable barbarism of an alien and
incomprehensible culture, she is seen as exemplifying what is to be
detested and to be feared about "Islamic fundamentalism. ,3 Yet, the
earliest modem use of suicide bombings arose in the context of a civil
war in which its use was to drive out outsiders rather than to
communicate any religious message. 4  Elsewhere, it has been
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in the 2006 University of Maryland "Constitutional Schmooze," and he hereby wishes to
express his especial thanks to Professor Mark Graber for organizing the Schmooze.
1. John 8:7 (King James).
2. The conventional wisdom is captured in Dan Eggen & Scott Wilson, Suicide Bombs
Potent Tools of Terrorists, WASH. POST, July 17, 2005, at Al: "[u]nheard of only a few
decades ago, suicide bombings have rapidly evolved into perhaps the most common method of
terrorism in the world."
3. As Gabriel Almond and others have pointed out, given its origins in the internecine
conflict among American Christians, politicians and scientists on the question of evolution, "it
is ironic that today, 'fundamentalism' is used most frequently to refer to Islamist movements."
See STRONG RELIGION: THE RISE OF FUNDAMENTALISMS AROUND THE WORLD 2 (Gabriel A.
Almond, R. Scott Appleby & Emmanuel Sivan eds., 2003) [hereinafter STRONG RELIGION].
4. Hizb'allah (or "Hezbollah" ("Party of God")), a contending faction in the Lebanese
civil war, married the self-immolation of the suicide bomber with the by far much familiar car
bomb to force the United States and France out of the Lebanese civil war. See, e.g., ROBERT
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employed as a tool by Hindus and Sikhs seeking ethnic self-
determination in political conflicts with dominant national groups. 5
The two theaters in which it has been most extensively deployed-the
conflict between Palestinians and Israelis, and United States
occupation of Iraq-are less wars about religion than they are of
national identity and political autonomy. In short, the contemporary
suicide bomber uses her tool as much for the pursuit of self-
determination of her ethno-political identity as for religious purposes.
She is involved, it would seem, in much the same quest and contest for
political power as any participant in the modem struggle for control of
the state.
In the post-9/11 world, the equation of terrorism with Islamic
fundamentalism is, for many, as straightforward as it is unassailable.
Invoking the mastermind of that event, Osama Bin Laden and his Al
Qaeda organization-as the exemplar of modern terrorism, and the
latter as the ultimate threat to Western civilization-it has become
standard fare to argue that because these actors are fundamentalist
Muslims, it follows that they have acted on behalf of fundamentalist or
"extremist" Islam, which is said to pose a mortal threat to "Western"
or "Judaeo-Christian civilization." 6 This argument is advanced even
though Mr. Bin Laden's grievances can and have been articulated in
standard nationalist and secular terms.7  But when more closely
BAER, SEE No EVIL: THE TRUE STORY OF A GROUND SOLDIER IN THE CIA'S WAR ON
TERRORISM 66-67 (2003); MIR BLOOM, DYING TO KILL: THE ALLURE OF SUICIDE TERROR 1, 4
(2005).
5. See, e.g., BLOOM, supra note 4, at 45 et seq. As Mike Davis puts it: "[s]uicide truck
bombs, once the distinctive signature of Hezbollah, have been franchised to Sri Lanka,
Chechnya/Russia, Turkey, Egypt, Kuwait and Indonesia." See Mike Davis, The Poor Man's
Air Force: A History of the Car Bomb, TOMDISPATCH.COM, Apr. 12, 2006,
http://www.tomdispatch.com/index.mhtml?pid=76140.
6. In recent months, both Prime Minister Blair of the United Kingdom and President
Bush of the United States constantly have asserted that the use of terror represents an
"ideology," but neither leader has articulated with any specificity the content of the ideology.
See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the British Prime Minister, PM's Press Conference (Aug. 5,
2005), available at http://www.numberlO.gov.uk/output/Page8041.asp; Prime Minister Tony
Blair, Statement to United Nations Security Council on Terrorism (Sept. 14, 2005), available
at http://www.pm.gov.uk/output/Page8191.asp; President George W. Bush, Remarks on the
War on Terrorism at The Woodrow Wilson Center (Dec. 14, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/12/20051214-1.html; President George W.
Bush, Speech to the Naval Academy on the War on Terrorism (Nov. 30, 2005), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/11/20051130-2.html.
7. For my development of this claim, see Maxwell 0. Chibundu, For God, For
Country, For Universalism: Sovereignty as Solidarity in Our Age of Terror, 56 FLA. L. REV.
883 (2004). My contention in that essay subsequently has been corroborated by the evidence
adduced in United States courtrooms. Thus, the debriefing of Mr. Khalid Sheik Mohammed
(purportedly the "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks) by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency
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examined, what is in fact feared about the contemporary suicide
bomber, car bomber, or indeed any "terrorist," ultimately, is not so
much her capacity to do harm as it is the belief that because of her
complete and seemingly irrational commitment to a faith or cause that
we do not understand, she cannot be reasoned with nor readily bought
off. In short, it is at heart a fear of complete and unquestioning loyalty
to religion, and "Islamic fundamentalism" is thus no more than a
convenient representation of a deep-seated phenomenon.
Precisely what constitutes a religion, and how well does the
"liberal" mindset understand the concept? We can of course tell
differences among religions. There are the familiar and not-so-
familiar doctrines, practices, and institutions by which we segregate
religious denominations. More often than not, people simply self-
select, and we respect their selection by according them the status of
being members of one religion or another. But these do not define
what is distinctive about religion or what separates religion from
science or politics. A quite standard answer, I think, is that at heart,
religion is about faith or dogma: the acceptance of a view that does not
have to be sustained through empiricism, or persuasion through
falsifiable evidence. 8  This answer is consistent with the liberal
viewpoint that presents religion essentially as a private matter, or, at
most, an assemblage of private matters. Individuals are free to believe
whatever they choose to believe precisely because their belief is of
little moment to society at large. "Fundamentalism," by putting a
belief system on a pedestal, thus threatens this perception of religion as
a societally (if not socially) inconsequential matter of the heart that is
best understood in individualistic terms. "Fundamentalist Islam" thus
and introduced into evidence at the death penalty proceedings against Mr. Moussaoui, explains
the 9/11 attacks as intended to "wake the American people up" to their government's support
of Israel's occupation of Palestinian lands and of despotic Arab rulers. See The Reporters
Committee for Freedom of the Press, Moussaoui Trial Exhibits and Documents: Substitution
for Testimony-Khalid Sheik Mohammed (introduced as Defense Exhibit 0941, Mar. 28,
2006), available at http://www.rcfp.org/moussaoui. But see STRONG RELIGION, supra note 3,
at 2 (asserting that "Bin Laden, working through his extensive al Qaeda network had
engineered the [9/11] attacks as an act of a jihad, or holy war, against the United States and its
allies").
8. This is admittedly a much broader definition of religion than that espoused by those
who wish to distinguish religion from science. Typically, these writers emphasize the
distinction between "belief in a supernatural being," which by definition is unverifiable, and
acceptance of the validating processes of the "scientific" method of argumentation and
refutation. See, e.g., DANIEL DINETr, BREAKING THE SPELL: RELIGION AS A NATURAL
PHENOMENON (2006). It seems to me that the concept of a "supernatural being" may well be
essential to the monotheistic religions of the West, but it is not necessarily so in non-Western
belief systems.
2006]
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is seen as a threat to a hitherto comfortable myth, and because it is
from without, it appears less subject to being tamed or domesticated.
But is not this a defeatist view of liberalism?
In matters of religion, humankind may be divided into three
typologies. There are the believers, the non-believers and the
agnostics. Believers inherit the truth: for them, conviction is a matter
of faith. Non-believers, again on the basis of faith--or, more
accurately, lack of conviction as to the particular subject matter of the
faith in question-reject the received wisdom of the believer. They
demand empirical validation, and insist on being persuaded through
reason and verifiable evidence. A believer in one set of truths may of
course be a non-believer with regard to a separate set of truths. What
unites both is the certainty that the truths in which they believe
necessarily must be accepted by all right-thinking people, and that to
question such truth is to display apostasy. All believers are thus
"universalists." 9 Agnostics are indifferent about belief. They disdain
participation in the game of faith or lack thereof. Unwilling to make
any commitment one way or the other, they expect none in return.
Like the believer and non-believer, an agnostic is not indifferent with
regard to all matters, but gets off the fence from time to time to
subscribe first to one set of faiths, or to denounce others. The agnostic
is not a universalist. For her, all claims are provisional, that is, only
good until a better truth comes along or the current belief is shown to
be flawed. Lacking the certitude of faith, the agnostic, however
skeptical about the basis for faith, is nonetheless deferential, if not
outright respectful, of believers and non-believers and atheists alike.
She is, as they say, a "relativist."
Until quite recently, liberal political and philosophical
thought, 10 like its cousin, industrial scientific thought, was firmly in
the agnostic camp. This world view sometimes-but erroneously-
termed "secular,"11 was the product of a particular age and time. It
9. There are of course among believers varying levels of commitment to any belief
system, and "fundamentalism" is sometimes employed to indicate this variation. But whether
acknowledged or not, any belief system that demands commitment on the basis of no more
than faith is by definition "fundamentalist"; and as I shall argue in this essay, this view of
fundamentalism is as true in the religion of politics as it is in orthodox religions.
10. The phrase is elucidated below. See infra Part HI.
11. See id. for a discussion of "secularism" and "liberalism."
12. There is of course a difference between the existence of a viewpoint and the claim
that the viewpoint dominates. While contending here that the dominant classical liberal
perspective as to religion may be agnostic, I am in no way disagreeing with Peter Berger's
assertion (which I endorse) that "the assumption that we live in a secularized world is false.
The world today, with some exceptions ... is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some
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now appears that we are at the end of its moment, an era that in the
overall sweep of human history has actually been quite brief.13 Ours is
an age in which it is essential both to believe in substantive norms, and
to proclaim those norms as truths that are superior and exclusive of all
others. Contemporary liberal, political and philosophical thought thus
is emerging as a religion, one that is not fundamentally different from
other religions that have dominated human history-Hinduism,
Judaism, Buddhism, Christianity and Islam being the best known.
Modem Liberalism is in the midst of an epochal change, transforming
a system of agnostic thought into a dogma, going down much the same
path that Confucianism once took.1 4  Elements of Liberal thought
remain, but far from being agnostic about faith, neoliberalism now
enshrines certain dogmas as pillars of society that need no empirical
validation for their legitimation. This neoliberalism furnishes less a
method of thinking through issues than a series of rehearsed dogmas,
unquestioning adherence to which is essential for membership in the
"community of civilized peoples." Significantly, it now competes
with other religious faiths, casting those with which it wishes to wage
war as "fundamentalist," much as Christianity and Islam have
employed "apostasy" "blasphemy" and "heresy" as grounds for
separating believers from those who would defile them.
This essay explores one area of liberalism's move from
agnosticism to theistic liberalism (or, as I shall sometimes refer to it,
"neoliberalism"): namely, the deification of "democracy." At its core
is the thesis that neoliberalism's invocation and treatment of the ideal
of democracy is representative of a much broader phenomenon in
neoliberal methodology: a tendency to convert ideals into dogmas.
The approach is one that is not uncommon to successful religions,
especially those grounded in monotheism and a Manichean world
places more so than ever." THE DESECULARIZATION OF THE WORLD: RESURGENT RELIGION
AND WORLD POLITIcs 2 (Peter L. Berger ed., 1999).
13. Among International Relations specialists, it is common to date the modem age of
the state to the 1648 treaty of Westphalia. No similar precision exists in the dating of the
concept of liberalism, but its rudimentary roots may be traced back to the same time period. It
stumbled and flowered over the next century and a half, so that by the time of the French and
American Revolutions, it was an identifiably coherent set of thoughts that, among other things,
put the fate of the person in the hands of the individual rather than in a supernatural deity or an
all-powerful divine monarch.
14. See, e.g., the entry on "Confucianism" in Wikipedia which points out that
meritocracy had originally been a bureaucratic response to the demands of a fast-growing and
centralizing state in the early Han Dynasty but in time became ritualized as an imperial
religion and became embedded in the legal structures of the state. Wikipedia, Confucianism:
Meritocracy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Confucianism#Meritocracy (as of Sept. 8, 2006,
23:23 GMT).
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view. It identifies an admittedly desirable ideal, insists on its
acceptance as necessary to human salvation, and discriminatorily
excommunicates some who appear unwilling to subjugate their views
to the decreed norm, while exempting others from its rigors. This
essay contends that this neoliberal transformation represents a move
from the status of the outsider uncomfortable with the exercise of
political power and seeking to constrain its abuse to that of the insider
thoroughly comfortable in its use and certainly unexercised about its
abuse. Comprehending this transformation demands an understanding
of the two very distinct ways in which the ideas of the liberal state and
the ideas of fundamentalist religions engage each other. In the first,
the state is viewed as a dispassionate peacemaker or an "honest
broker" among competing religious interests. It takes no position on
the substantive merit of religious claims, and indeed it expressly
attempts to distance itself from being viewed as engaged in the
perennial struggles of believers. The defense of this stance is rooted in
the fact and appearance of procedural rectitude. In the second, the
state partakes of the practices of religiosity, clothing itself in the aura
of sociological exceptionalism that is central to religious faith. The
state does not embrace any of the standard religions, but rather
presents a potentially competing dogma of its own, a dogma that is
rooted in a secular conception of substantive justice.
The essay first presents some vignettes that convey the
contemporary conventional accounts of the conflicts between religious
dogma and the mediating role of the liberal state. The vignettes
suggest the strengths and limitations of the standard portraiture. Next,
the essay describes the evolution of liberalism from the interaction of
religion and state. This description in part explains the partial myth of
the state as an honest and independent broker among competing
religious impulses. But it also suggests why the liberal state has
always had a direct and conflicting interest with the claims of religion.
The essay goes on to introduce one of the cardinal dogmas of
contemporary neoliberalism, "democracy." It explores the ideological
and institutional biases of the dogma and locates its entrenchment
within the power politics of the post-Cold War neoliberal order. The
final part of the essay seeks an explanation of the dogmatization of
democracy by comparing the contemporary socio-political
environment with the enlightenment age that spawned classical
liberalism and launched the modem democratic era. Here, the focus of
the essay is on demonstrating how unarbitrable faith proceeds from a
flexible formula of dissent and experimentation. This essay suggests
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that agnosticism can metamorphose into dogma when the agnostic
obtains sufficient power to impose her views on others.
"Fundamentalism" turns out to be less an alien attribute of outliers
than a mainstay of a culture of comfort and certitude in received
wisdom that is validated by the success that is found in the singularity
of power. Neoliberalism now endows democracy with that mantle.
II. CONTEMPORARY LIBERAL THOUGHT AND RELIGION: SOME
VIGNETTES
To say that religion has presented significant challenges to
liberalism as a mode of governance is to state the obvious. Yet,
articulating the nature and scope of the challenge is not always easy.
Much of what has been written about the intersection of religion and
contemporary secular life focuses on the challenge that the former
supposedly poses for the institutions of liberal democracy. There is no
denying that conflict, but the excessive focus on it has shielded and
obscured the changes in liberal theory that has made it increasingly
more like the religion with which it ostensibly was at war. Because
demonstrating this proposition comes up against a near unanimous
conventional wisdom, it might be helpful to begin with what loosely
can be called a "thought experiment." Below, I present nine vignettes
that, on their face, typify the conflicts in which liberalism supposedly
stands out as a mediating and moderating influence on combative and
fundamentalist religion. In reviewing these vignettes, I ask that you
first record your instinctual preferences among the contending
interests, then reflect on the nature of the conflicts and consider
whether the conclusions that you arrive at mirror your instinctual
reactions.
1. A familiar catechism found in the First Amendment of
the United States Constitution at once prohibits the United States
Congress-and by interpretive extension, all governments in the
United States-from restricting the rights of individuals to freely
express and practice their religious beliefs, and from extending support
for any particular religious belief or practice.1 5 As with all catechisms,
some of its most interesting aspects deal less with its core prohibitions
(mortal sins) than with symbolic violations (venial sins). Is the
inclusion of the phrase "under God" in a routinized and pro forma
15. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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incantation of the "Pledge of Allegiance" consistent with the
prohibition on the establishment of religion? 6  Should it be allowed
because it is an insignificant "nothing burger," or denounced precisely
because it trivializes religion? 17
2. Islam requires that women be attired modestly.'8
Among orthodox practitioners of Islam, this has been construed as
requiring that women cover themselves as completely as possible.
19
The wearing of the hijab, a distinctive head covering by Muslims, was
outlawed recently in French primary and secondary schools on the
ground that it conveyed a message of inferiority that is inconsistent
with the secular personality of the state. But what is the "secular
personality" of the state, and is it so fragile that the mere wearing of
the hijab overthrows it, or is that personality so domineering that it
must necessarily extinguish all competing allegiances including that of
the religious believer in the Islamic faith?
20
16. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004) (avoiding on
grounds of lack of standing to decide whether the inclusion of the phrase "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance recited by public school children interferes with the religious rights of
child and parent). Compare Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992) (holding as
unconstitutional the offering of "non-sectarian prayer" in an assembly of public school
children).
17. A similar ambiguity is posed by challenges to the constitutionality of the placement
of religious symbols in public places. Compare McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties
Union of Ky., 125 S. Ct. 2722 (2005) (striking down as constitutionally impermissible the
display in county courthouse of the Ten Commandments because purpose of display was to
"emphasize and celebrate the Commandments' religious message") with Van Orden v. Perry,
125 S. Ct. 2854 (2005) (finding that placement of monument inscribed with Ten
Commandments on state ground was constitutionally permissible because while the Ten
Commandments were undoubtedly religious, they also had undeniable historical meaning).
18. See HOLY QUR'AN 24:31, 33:59 (Muhammad M. Pickthall trans., Muslim World
League 1977) (c. 1537-1538).
19. For an accessible discussion of the interpretive difficulties presented by this
Qur'anic injunction, see the Wikipedia entry:
These injunctions may have been clear to the earliest Muslims, but their
exact meaning is less clear to later Muslims. We do not know precisely
what seventh century CE Arab men and women wore or what was then
considered modest or immodest. How do these rules apply to Muslims in
later times, in different societies, wearing different clothing?
Wikipedia, Hijab, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hijab (as of Sept. 7, 2006, 06:05 GMT).
20. See, e.g., Pierre Tevanian, Banning the Hijab: Say No to Racial Discrimination, LE
MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Eng. Ed.), Feb. 2004 (arguing against the exclusion of Muslim girls
from French schools for their wearing of the hijab); Henri Pena-Ruiz, Banning the Hijab: Say
Yes to a Secular France, LE MONDE DIPLOMATIQUE (Eng. Ed.), Feb. 2004 (arguing that the
prohibition of the wearing of the hijab is central to French secularism, which in turn is
essential to the functioning of law and freedom in French society). The debate in France is not
unlike that which attends issues of the "free exercise" of religion in the United States. While
the "school prayer" cases question the capacity of the state to enfranchise the practice of
religion in public places, the free exercise cases challenge the authority of the state to
disenfranchise the private practice of religion. But since both involve essentially symbolic
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3. In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001
attacks on buildings in the United States by airplane hijackers,
President Bush declared that the country would wage a "crusade"
against those responsible for the attacks. 2  The choice of the term
(assuming there was a choice) 22 has been roundly criticized for
evoking a history of religious conflict between Islam and Christianity.
On the other hand, the use of the term "jihad" in describing activities
by Muslims is commonplace and generally unremarked about, even
though its consequences may be just as pernicious.2 3  Does this
differential treatment symbolically express differences in the role of
the state and of public officials in the treatment of Christian liberalism
and Islamic fundamentalism, and if so, precisely what are the
differences thus being expressed?
4. The widespread violence and bloodshed precipitated by
the publication and dissemination in the mass media of lampoons of
the founder of the Islamic faith have given rise to much commentary
about the virtues and limits of symbolic speech within societies and
24across cultures. It has generated extensive reflections about the
public acts, no bright line can exist between the two claims. Compare Employment Div.,
Dept. of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that practitioners of
religion cannot be exempted from a general law that prohibits the use of a classified narcotic)
with Gonzales v. 0 Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 126 S. Ct. 1211 (2006)
(holding that practitioners of a religion validly may be exempted from laws that otherwise
restrict the availability of a classified narcotic to the general public).
21. See President George W. Bush, Remarks upon Arrival at the White House South
Lawn (Sept. 16, 2001), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010916-2.htnl.
22. It is at least as probable that President Bush employed the term "crusade" without
intending to express any particularized religious animus towards Islam. The term had been
used in the context of the "war against communism" which had been at its apogee during
President Bush's formative years, and it is hardly inconceivable that the phrase may have
sprung to his lips in a fleeting moment of attempted erudition as he got off his presidential
helicopter.
23. See, e.g., Rone Tempest, In Lodi Terror Case, Intent was the Clincher, L.A. TIMES,
May 1, 2006, at BI.
The government had no direct evidence. The confession was vague and
even contradictory. And the statements about attacking American targets
came only after heavy prompting from FBI interrogators. . . . In his
closing comments to the jury, Assistant U.S. Atty. Robert Tice-Raskin
summed it up: "Hamid Hayat had a jihadi heart and a jihadi mind." That
was the clincher for the jury, ... [h]e now faces up to 39 years in prison.
Id. Cf. Sentenced for Speaking, WASH. POST, July 17, 2005, at B6 (editorializing, with regard
to the imposition of a life sentence on a Muslim preacher charged solely with having preached
a "jihad" against the United States and with no evidence of any one having acted on his
suggestions that "life in prison for inciting a jihad that never got waged is excessive").
24. See, e.g., Gerard Alexander, Illiberal Europe: The Long and Growing List of Things
You Can't Legally Say, THE WEEKLY STANDARD, Apr. 10, 2006, available at
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/055sbhvq.asp?pg=l;
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appropriateness of "self-censorship" and "press responsibility" in
handling "sensitive issues," and "respect and tolerance" for the beliefs
of others. 2 5 While for some the issue is simply the "democratic" right
of the press to publish freely, and for others, the obligation of the
majority to respect the religious preferences of minorities within their
societies, it is fair to say that for a significant segment of the
population, the question is why any state should bother to intrude into
matters involving the caricatures of a long-dead male, religious or
otherwise.
A classical liberal who disputes that there are foundational
truths would be perfectly comfortable taking and defending any of the
seemingly conflicting positions presented by these vignettes. The
issues that they raise, while symbolically important for the individual
believer or non-believer, are not central to the liberal conflict between
state and religion. The liberal state can hospitably provide a forum in
which the various positions are aired, and as between these positions it
can in fact maintain studied neutrality. This is so even with regard to
the Pledge of Allegiance or the wearing of the hijab. Neither the
permitting nor the denial of either practice essentially challenges the
concept of the state as a political community. In short, while debaters
may genuinely disagree about what value to assign to the words in the
Pledge of Allegiance, to the term "crusade," or even to the propriety of
publishing derogatory cartoons of a revered Prophet, traversing the
other side's position should be no cause for social upheaval. For
Jane Kramer, The Dutch Model: Multiculturalism and Moslem Immigrants, THE NEW YORKER,
Apr. 3, 2006, at 6.
25. See, e.g., Flemming Rose, Why I Published Those Cartoons, WASH. POST, Feb. 19,
2006, at B 1; Stanley Fish, Our Faith in Letting It All Hang Out, N.Y. TiMES, Feb. 12, 2006, at
15.
26. Two cases involving the use of chaplains to give benedictions to local legislative
assemblies nicely illustrate the point. Here, the issue is not whether to compel immature
juveniles to pray to an allegedly omniscient deity, but whether in offering prayers on behalf of
full grown adults, the state can in fact circumscribe the religious identity of the person who
may give the benediction and the content of the benediction. In Simpson v. Chesterfield
County Bd. of Supervisors, 404 F.3d 276 (4th Cir. 2005), the appellate court rejected a
complainant's constitutional challenge of her exclusion from a list of persons who may offer
"non-sectarian prayer" at meetings of the County Board of Supervisors. The list apparently
was limited to ministers of the "Judaeo-Christian" or other "monotheistic" faith. The
complainant practiced the "Wiccan religion" or "witchcraft." In seeming contrast, the District
Court in Hinrichs v. Bosma, 400 F. Supp. 2d 1103 (S.D. Ind. 2005), enjoined the Indiana State
House of Representatives from opening its sessions with prayer because the text of the prayers
frequently were "too Christian." These decisions clearly have symbolic value, but it is
difficult to argue seriously that the fate of the republic in any way rides on which of the
competing positions ultimately wins out-slippery slope and parade of horrible arguments
notwithstanding.
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believers and non-believers alike, the value of prevailing in these
debates lies less in the recomposition of substantive social norms that
might follow, and more in the symbolic social power that would be
conveyed through the acceptance or rejection of their preferred
position.27 The state can maintain detachment from conflicts over the
symbolic speech at stake, intruding only when necessary to assure that
particular conduct does not threaten the peace and physical security of
the members of the community. Put another way, the democratic
process, coupled with whatever constitutional safeguards exist for
protecting the interests of minorities within the community are
sufficient to address the issues presented by these four vignettes.
Contrast these situations with five others.
5. The United States (as indeed virtually all modem states)
promises every child within its jurisdiction free primary education. 28
Its laws make this promise especially salient for children with "special
needs." 29 The First Amendment of its Constitution, as already alluded
to, however, prohibits it from engaging in any actions that would
interfere with either the "free exercise" of religion, or its
"establishment." 30  Which one of these prohibitions trumps where a
disabled child seeks to obtain free education adapted to her needs in a
parochial school? Is the state precluded from providing necessary
supplemental assistance within this setting?
31
27. This is not to deny substantive consequences for specific individuals, nor to
challenge-let alone demean-the depth and sincerity with which symbolic positions may be
held. Thus one can grant that Mr. Newdow, like Mr. Fleming Rose of the Jyllands-Posten,
and Mr. Mohammed Asaadi of the Yemen Observer, have experienced real and tangible hurt in
taking and maintaining their positions on the Pledge of Allegiance or the right to publish
cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed.
28. See, e.g., No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425
(2002) (codified at 20 U.S.C. § 6301 et seq. (2005)). Cf Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202 (1982)
(holding that the Equal Protection provision of the United States Constitution obligates states
to provide to children who may have been brought into the country illegally public education
on the same terms as it provides it to citizens and legal residents of the country).
29. See, e.g., Individuals With Disabilities Education Act, Pub. L. Nos. 91-230, Pub. L.
No. 108-446, 118 Stat. 2647 (2004) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.) (2005).
30. See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
31. United States Supreme Court decisions have not been entirely unequivocal, but
consistent with the arguments advanced here, the more recent decisions indicate a recognition
of the special place that education has in the affairs of the polity, and a corresponding
willingness to permit state funding assistance to and direction of educational services to the
entire population regardless of the venue in which they are provided-public or parochial. See,
e.g., Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist. 509 U.S. 1 (1993) (holding that a public school
district may be required, consistently with the United States Constitution, to provide an
interpreter to a deaf student attending a church-sponsored school); Agostini v. Felton, 521
U.S. 203 (1997) (reversing its earlier position that had invalidated precisely such
governmental assistance to disabled students in the parochial setting); Mitchell v. Helms, 530
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6. To encourage private philanthropy, the United States
exempts from taxation income derived by religious institutions.32 in
the wake of its "global war on terrorism," the United States has
adopted a policy of freezing financial transactions by institutions that it
deems to be affiliated with "terrorists." 33 The determination as to who
constitutes a terrorist, and the evidence of affiliation, is shrouded in
impenetrable secrecy. 34  What is to be said of this policy when all
available evidence indicates that it has been applied solely to
organizations affiliated with the Islamic faith?
7. The Islamic Resistance Movement--colloquially
referred to as Hamas-recently won the right to form the government
of the Palestinian territories on the West bank of the Jordan River and
Gaza. It did so by obtaining the majority of seats in a duly organized
election process that uniformly has been deemed to be "free and
fair."35 In response, the so-called "quartet" of international persons-
the European Union, Russia, the United Nations and the United
States-has sought to deny it political and economic legitimation.
They have thus insisted as the prelude to any possible dealings with a
Hamas-led Palestinian Government that Hamas cease being a "terrorist
organization," renounce its subscription to the use of violence and
revoke provisions in its charter that deny the "right" of Israel to exist
as a state. 36 Among other arguments, this position has been supported
in part by an argument that is of particular interest for the purpose of
this essay. That argument, which has been advanced in other settings
U.S. 793 (2000) (finding as constitutional government provision to parochial school of
textbooks, and in the process overruling prior holdings to the contrary); Zelman v. Simmons-
Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002) (holding that a state may, consistent with the United States
Constitution, provide publicly funded vouchers to children attending religiously sponsored
schools). Cf. Bd. Ed. Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994) (striking
down as unconstitutional state statute creating special school district for religious enclave for
practitioners of strict form of Judaism).
32. See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
33. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C.A. § 1702(a)(1)(C) (2006). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1)
(2006) (criminalizing the making of contributions to a "foreign terrorist organization").
34. See generally People's Mojahedin Org. of Iran v. Dep't of State, 327 F.3d 1238
(D.C. Cir. 2003). Cf. How Not to Treat Friends, WASH. POST, Apr. 28, 2006, at A18. (decrying
the elasticity of the concept of "terrorism," and pointing out that the "[m]isguided law now
prevents the admission of a member or backer of any group of 'two or more individuals' that
Iengages in, or has a subgroup which engages in,' activities as commonplace as using an
,explosive, firearm or other weapon or dangerous device').
35. See, e.g., So Sorry, BALTIMORE SUN, Feb. 27, 2006, at 8 ("[t]he fact that Hamas
came to power in a democratic election that the Bush administration pronounced free and fair
undercut Ms. Rice's pitch against funding a sponsor of terrorism").
36. See, e.g., Herb Keinon, Straw Softens Hamas Benchmarks, JERUSALEM POST, Apr.
11, 2006, at 1.
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that involve the possible accession to state power by so-called Islamic
fundamentalists, contends that Islamic-based parties are by definition
"theocratic," and hence both illiberal and anti-democratic. 37 Even
where such parties have permitted elections, as in Iran, such elections
are dismissed as not being "democratic." 38  But does liberalism
permit-or, in fact, does it entail-this sort of religiously-grounded
distinction within an otherwise acceptable practice?
8. Israel, self-referentially, is a "Jewish State," and
constantly wrestles with what is termed the "demographic problem,"
that is, the possibility that the Jewish composition of the state falls
below that necessary for the effective monopolization of power by the
Jewish citizens of the state.39  A polity whose ideals and institutions
find expression within the ethos of classical liberalism, Israel
nonetheless therefore discriminates explicitly among applicants for
40
citizenship on the basis of their professed faith. Jews, under the
"Law of Retum,' 41 regardless of their temporal or spatial connection
to the state are entitled to citizenship on demand, while others are
evaluated on criteria that are more restrictive of the grant of
37. See, e.g., Gregory Fox & Georg Nolte, Intolerant Democracies, 35 HARv. INT'L L.J.
1 (1995); FAREED ZAKARIA, THE FUTURE OF FREEDOM: ILLIBERAL DEMOCRACY AT HOME AND
ABROAD (2003). Cf. Christian Pippan and Emile Noel Fellow, Book Reviews, 15 EUR. J. INT'L
L. 213 (2004).
[T]he Constitutional Court of Turkey-a country whose population is
overwhelmingly Muslim-has unequivocally declared . . . that the
separation of state and religion was an indispensable condition of
democracy and that the rules of Sharia were incompatible with a
democratic regime. This view was shared by the European Court of
Human Rights, which, in upholding the judgment of the Turkish
Constitutional Court, noted that 'it is difficult to declare one's respect for
democracy and human rights while at the same time supporting a regime
based on Sharia,' not least because 'principles such as pluralism in the
political sphere or the constant evolution of public freedoms have no place
in it.'
Id. (references omitted).
38. The assertion that because Iran is a "theocracy," it cannot also be a "democracy" is
commonplace, but virtually never explained. Underlying the claim appears to be the view that
notwithstanding periodic elections for its political leadership, ultimate effective power resides
in the country's religious leadership. Compare Ali Khan, A Theory of Universal Democracy,
16 WISC. INT'L L. J. 61, 63-64 (1997).
39. See, e.g., Ilan Pappe, Ingathering: On the Israeli Election and the 'Demographic
Problem', LONDON REVIEW OF BOOKS, Apr. 20, 2006, available at
http://www.Irb.co.uk/v28/n08/print/papp0l-.html.
40. For a sympathetic account of the "moral conundrum" posed by the competing claims
of Israel's "democratic institutions" and the perceived need for ethno-religious identification,
see Roger I. Zakheim, Israel in the Human Rights Era: Finding a Moral Justification for the
Jewish State, 36 NYU J. INT'L L & POL. 1005 (2004).
41. The Law of Return, http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/return.htm.
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citizenship. Can such religion-based discrimination be reconciled
with liberalism?
9. In response to the events of September 11, 2001, the
United States invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the theocratically-
based Taliban government of the country. Together with its West
European allies, it organized and installed an ostensibly liberal
democratic constitution that demarcated power between the legislative,
executive and judicial branches of government. The Constitution
purports to guarantee to Afghans all of the usual panoply of human
rights, including freedom of religion. At the same time, it provides
that it shall not be interpreted in a manner that renders it inconsistent
with principles of Islam. In a storybook challenge to this liberal
reordering of a religious society, an Afghan convert to Christianity, in
apparent consistency with the Afghan Constitution and laws, was put
on trial for apostasy. The American president, himself an avowed
born-again Christian whose basic mantra is that he would do anything
to defend the American people, has been asked by his constituents to
get the Afghan government to drop the charge. Do liberal virtues
require deference to the Afghan Constitutional order, or is that order
vitiated by its basis in religion?
These five examples pose a different kind of challenge to
liberal thought than did the first four. The agnosticism of classical
liberalism cannot be maintained in evaluating any of these latter
situations. For, implicated in these later five cases is not the neutrality
of liberal thought in evaluating and giving effect to the choices of
citizens, but the identity of the state itself. In these situations, that
identity is juxtaposed against religion. Liberalism may facilitate the
negotiation that goes on between the state and religious institutions,
but it is not itself a neutral participant. It is anchored squarely on the
side of the state.
Thus, in a dispute between the authority of the state to assure
the civil education of the citizen and its obligation to avoid
discriminating among religious faiths, the state cannot take a neutral
stance. Similarly, the type of citizens that ought to be preferred by
Israel or the right of Palestinians to choose their own government
cannot be subjugated to concerns over religious equity. In short, in
these instances, what is at issue is nothing less than the identity of the
42. See, e.g., Albert K. Wan, Israel's Conflicted Existence as a Jewish Democratic
State: Striking the Proper Balance Under the Citizenship and Entry Into Israel Law, 29
BROOK. J. INT'L L. 1345 (2004).
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state itself, not its capacity to act as an honest broker among
competing intrastate interests.
Religious matters thus generate varied forms of state
involvement. The liberal state can afford to maintain detached
neutrality in some instances, and not in others. A liberal may well be
able to maintain agnosticism when the state is called upon to arbitrate
religiously-based disputes among its citizens, or even in conflict as to
ideology between a religion and some aspect of state politics. But in
matters involving the authority of the state to organize itself or to
create its own identity, an agnostic stance is not available to the liberal
thinker. Consider then the basis for your own personal reactions to the
cases just presented. It is more likely, I think, that they were patterned
after such criteria as your religious background, national origin or
ancestry, or citizenship. If you are an American, you might find that
vignettes one, five and six are more analogous than different, and that
vignette three shares more in common with seven than it does with
one. Similarly, a Christian or Muslim might find it easier to analogize
vignettes one or two with six than the latter with five or seven; and
many Palestinians and Israelis will probably disagree strongly that
vignettes seven and eight share similarities worth embracing in the
same discussion, and certainly not alongside vignette nine. But to
what extent are your positions in fact driven by empirical evidence?
How likely is it that those conclusions have been based on received
biases which you are reluctant to subject to scrutiny, and equally
reluctant to abandon even in the face of overwhelming evidence
undercutting them? It is a measure of your acceptance of the claims of
liberalism if you find yourself able to suppress some of these
instinctual reactions in the face of contradictions generated by a
reasoned evaluation of empirical evidence.
There is of course one sense in which the liberal viewpoint
itself has always been a matter of faith. It is in its claim of the state as
the organizing hierarchy of political life. For liberalism, belief in the
state is fundamental. In that sense, all liberals are fundamentalists
with regard to the state, even if they are agnostic about the
supernatural and religious deism. In all of the examples presented
above, the articulated problems arise only against a backdrop in which
the state functions as the source of legitimating authority. As a
pragmatist and a lawyer, I can find justification for this position in the
raw material of my profession-legal decisions and academic
articles-but the vast majority of humanity are not lawyers, and as
difficult as it may be to imagine, most of humanity function with little
2006]
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explicit realization of the overwhelming influence that the state has on
their lives. But they are willing to accept (that is to say, in the
parlance of academic disciplines, "legitimize") the state as long as it
functions effectively to provide and secure their needs for safety and
happiness.43 While it is therefore possible to justify the belief in the
state as part of a utilitarian calculus, for the vast majority of humanity,
"patriotism" and "nationalism" have often been demonstrations of
faith rather than logic. In contemporary liberal societies, another idea
increasingly is being presented as a dogma. Hitherto a second-order
principle-"democracy"-is now being trumpeted as a right of
humanity, the objective legitimacy of which must be deemed beyond
cavil. It is this rise of "democracy" to the pantheon of an infallible
deity that this essay examines. And in discussing the issue, I invite
you to examine the extent to which your belief in it is in any
meaningful sense different from the reactions that you had to the
thought experiments just presented.
III. POLITICS AND RELIGION
Political power and religion have always been closely related,
and understandably so. The former consists in the capacity of a
handful of persons to command obedience from the populace. Wealth,
might, and charisma have been essential assets for the acquisition of
political power, but maintaining such power on the bases of these
assets alone can be remarkably costly. Of vital importance, therefore,
also has been the need that the obedience to political power be seen as
natural or preordained. In contemporary parlance, the obedience must
flow instinctively from a felt sense of the legitimacy of the source of
the power. 44  Until the enlightenment period, religion typically
furnished the authoritative basis for such legitimation of state power.
Rulers who otherwise possessed the other sources of power
supplicated to those in possession of religious authority, while those in
religious authority often used their capacity to confer legitimation to
obtain some or all of the other sources of political power.
From Sumeria to Egypt to Rome and Byzantium, and the
middling kingdoms and empires in-between, human history, and
43. Compare THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN (J.C.A. Gaskin ed., Oxford Univ. Press
1996) (1652).
44. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46 (1992).
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certainly that part of it we now call Western civilization, the close
intertwining of the struggles for political power and for religious
authority, was the essence of socio-political history. One of the
seminal achievements of European enlightenment, to which liberalism
is an offspring, was the successful delinking of the spheres of political
and religious power. This does not mean that the struggle for both
were no longer related, but Europe's enlightenment assured that
victory in the one, however complete, did not automatically result in
domination over the other. In place of religion, the sanctification of
state political power was to be grounded on human agency. Popular
sovereignty was the quintessence of such grounding, but it was not
unique: legal positivism, the dictatorship of the proletariat, national
fascism, and democracy all derive from this basic core.
Liberalism was a primary tool in the enlightenment's creation
of an effective disjuncture between power over the sacred and power
over the mundane life of individuals. The emergence of liberalism in
Europe was contingent on the prolonged conflict between the church
and the numerous suzerains and princes that dotted the European
political landscape. This conflict became especially pronounced
following the end of the fourth crusade, and the fall of Constantinople.
In the Reformation, the divisions within church doctrine could no
longer be patched up, and the essential benediction of the church for
the exercise of power became all too obviously dispensable. The
ability of princes and merchants to acquire wealth through conquest of
and commercial intercourse with lands and peoples outside of the
established territories of Christendom-primarily in the Americas and
East Asia-provided them an independent source of power that was
not automatically associated with legitimation through the church. It
was in this environment that liberalism emerged to offer an alternative
basis for the legitimation of the authority of the state. And this
alternative took about three centuries to gain anything approximating
ascendancy.
Liberalism, and particularly its separation from the religious
dogma of rulership as a right conferred by a sacred divinity, did not of
course emerge as a full-blown theory of politics. In the work of Jean
Bodin, a French political thinker of the sixteenth century, its rudiments
are evident. Where orthodox religion sought to regulate all aspects of
human life, state (or sovereign) power was to be limited to the public
sphere. But if state power is not coextensive with religious power, and
if it thus can no longer be legitimated solely through the processes of
confirmation by religious edicts, from where does the authority of the
2006]
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ruler flow? Bodin was not precisely clear, but he did lock onto the
idea of sovereignty as power whose exercise is limited to the public
sphere, even if absolute within that sphere. Individuals in their private
life thus were not subject to sovereign authority, even if that authority
emanated from divinity.45 This mystical conception of sovereignty
was clarified three quarters of a century later in the work of Thomas
Hobbes. For Hobbes, sovereignty flowed from the voluntary giving up
by individuals of their natural rights in exchange for protection by the
sovereign.46 This contractarian view of the concept of the relationship
between the population and their rulers rapidly gained ascendancy in
Europe. It is at the heart of the work of the so-called social contract
theorists ranging from Locke to Rousseau to Rawls. Alongside them
were those who built its structural edifices, notably Montesquieu,
Bentham and Austin. This latter group focused less on theorizing the
sources and justifications of the exercise of legitimate authority, than
on fashioning those institutions that, whatever the source of
sovereignty, effectively confined it within its legitimate bounds. But
whether one focuses on the ideas of sovereignty or on the institutions
that check sovereignty, we find in both the essence of "popular
sovereignty": a concept that is in its own right as mystical and based
on religious faith as are the notions of trinity and arianism.
The idea of "popular sovereignty" has given rise to a legion of
offspring. Concepts as readily distinguishable-and indeed frequently
in conflict-as the amorphous and freewheeling chants of "libert6,
egalit6 et fraternit" of the French Revolution, the "unalienable rights"
and "ordered liberty" of the American Constitution, A.V. Dicey's
"English rule of law," Marxist-Leninist concept of the proletarian
revolution, Wilsonian "self-determination," Mussolini's and Hitler's
"national socialism," and post-World War II decolonization and
national liberation movements all have significant credible bases for
claiming descent from liberalism's notion of popular sovereignty, as
does, of course, "democracy." What distinguishes these from each
other is less their ideological pedigree than the institutions through
which the ideology is to be achieved. Moreover, all of these concepts
were second-order products of the liberal principle. They were each
subject to the overweening influence, indeed power, of the state, which
remained supreme and stood above them all. In fact, they engaged in
conflict with each other over control of the institutions with which the
45. See generally JEAN BODIN, Six BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH (M.J. Tooley ed.,
Blackwell 1955) (1576).
46. See generally HOBBES, supra note 43.
[VOL. 6:117
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AS A RELIGION
state exercised its power. What distinguishes neoliberalism from
classical liberalism may well be the success of the former in
enshrining "democracy" as a singular principle that is at least on par
with the idea of the state itself. That success, I shall explain, flows
less from the inherent virtue of the idea than the possession of military
and economic might by those who preach it. And not surprisingly, the
idea in turn has been subverted to reinforce the entrenchment and
perpetuation of that military might and economic wealth: a reinforcing
relationship of dogma and power that should be familiar to the
sociologist of power.
I shall shortly explore in some depth this contemporary
infatuation with "democracy" not only as an ideal form of governance,
but also as its sole legitimate incarnation. But before addressing the
merits of that argument, a collateral claim is worth considering,
however briefly, for it has some resonance for the contemporary
debate on the place of "Islamic fundamentalism" and "Christian
liberalism." The collateral issue is why "secular liberalism" succeeded
in overthrowing "orthodox religion" as the legitimating principle of
the "modern" (that is to say "Western") state. The commonplace
wisdom that underlies the current insistence on the universalization of
liberal ideals is that the philosophical underpinnings of liberalism, and
therefore the primacy of value that it places on the autonomy and
freedom of the individual and of tolerance for divergent perspectives
and personalities,47 make it morally superior to religious ideals. In its
flexibility, liberalism permits those with religious ideals to realize
them within the framework of the state, while religion does not. Like
any commonplace wisdom, the claim is not lacking in some factual
basis, but it is overstated and reverses the causal order. Besides, it
understates the instrumental relationship between the material efficacy
of a governing order and its legitimation.
As a demonstrable historical matter, liberalism did not create
the modern state; rather, if a complex relationship is to be simplified,
the modern state (including its opponents) created liberalism. The
modern state was (and indeed continues to be) as much the product of
technological advances-in agriculture, communication and
transportation-as it was the instantiation of any normative order,
religious or secular. That the modern state first arrived in Europe and
grew along with European expansion reflected Europe's strengths in
mastering the science and technologies of these basic human activities.
47. These arguments most recently have been powerfully developed by KWAME
ANTHONY APPIAH, THE ETHICS OF IDENTITY (2005).
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Europe's capabilities may have been influenced by its religious norms,
but these preceded the emergence of liberalism. And, indeed, it is
doubtful that the particular climate of religiosity in Europe itself was
decisive in giving Europe its preeminent place in science and
technology. What is clear is that the roots of the modem state and,
with it, Europe's ascendancy as the most powerful aggregation of
economic, commercial and political interests, derive from its scientific
prowess, and that the cultural hegemony symbolized in "liberalism"
and "democracy" is the product rather than the cause of that
ascendancy.
48
In one of those wonderful confluences of history, much of the
contemporary discussions about Islam and Christianity, the European
and Muslim worlds, the state and religion, American might and Arab
weakness, harkens to a symbolic moment of encounter in the past: the
year 1492. The so-called "expulsion" of the Moors from Western
Europe coincided with the "discovery" of America, an event that was
the fruition of advances in maritime technologies and sciences. The
"discovery" and the economic returns that it engendered unleashed
fierce competition among European powers: Spain and Portugal, the
United Provinces of Holland and the United Kingdom, The United
Kingdom and France. Some of the competition, such as those between
Holland and Portugal in South East Asia, or between France and
England in North America, were cast in religious terms - Catholic
Portugal against Protestant Holland, for example - but religion was
hardly dispositive. After all, Protestant Britain and Holland were just
as likely to be in competition with each other as with Catholic France
and Spain. What is indisputable is that this pervasive sense of
competition among the subjects and on behalf of territorial sovereigns
and lieges spurred the emergence of the modern state alongside
quantum leaps in scientific knowledge. The fiercest of the
competition, however, took place within continental Europe.
Competition among the city states of the Italian peninsular and the
Germanic duchies and principalities of the disintegrating Holy Roman
Empire greatly influenced advances in the political and physical
sciences. It was this cauldron that gave birth to the modern state. As
Hobbes aptly put it, the state or "leviathan" was necessary to counter
48. I have developed these ideas elsewhere, and those interested in more than the
barebones presentation that I sketch here will find them detailed in Maxwell 0. Chibundu, The
Other in International Law: 'Community' and International Legal Order (Univ. of Md. Sch. of
Law Pub. Law and Legal Theory Working Paper, No. 2004-03, 2004), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=504782.
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and order a life that otherwise would be "solitary, poore, nasty,
brutish, and short."
49
The "enlightenment" produced prototypes of liberal political
thought, but it was also the age of science, industry and commerce.
Although not unrelated, these latter were demonstrably more
instrumental in shaping the nature and character of the state and
society than was liberal political thought. Commerce led to the
emergence of a middle-class that in turn invested heavily in science
and industry. As this class grew to be influential, it found its voice in
the publications of newspapers and pamphlets, which the ruling
monarchs, aristocrats and their clerical supporters then sought to
suppress. Freedom of speech and of the press, two liberal
philosophical icons, instrumentally emerged to support the nascent
bourgeois class. But liberalism remained an obscure philosophy
espoused by a small group of highly educated persons.
The refrains of "liberty" and "equality," mimed in the French
revolution and its anticlerical bias and worship of reason, may have
suggested the arrival of liberalism at the epitome of political power,
but the excesses of the Terror and Imperial Wars of Napoleon
Bonaparte produced counterforces that continued the marginalization
of liberalism as the legitimate source of political power in Europe over
the next century. Indeed, it took two world wars and the total defeat of
fascism on the one hand, and the Cold War and the collapse of
communism on the other, for liberalism to assert itself as the
unchallenged ruling political doctrine that it has become. Liberalism
has thus prevailed as much through the military might of those
governments that espouse it as by the inherent internal logic of its
underpinning norms. It is of course quite possible that in these armed
conflicts, the liberal governments owed their successes to the internal
strengths of liberalism, but this is at least a debatable proposition, and
one that is not commonly put forward as support for the spread of
liberalism. Secular liberalism has thus triumphed over fundamentalist
religion not because of any intrinsic superior worth, but because those
who have sought legitimation through it have been on the ascendancy
in military and economic power.
49. See HOBBES, supra note 43, at ch. 8.
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IV. THE DEMOCRATIC IDEAL AND THE TRIUMPH OF NEOLIBERALISM
The term "democracy" is now bandied around with the same
deceptive self-assurance of its unproblematic meaning that was once
the lot of such other cultural icons as "progressive," "modem,"
"civilized," and even "liberal." And like those terms, its use is more
often than not intended to obfuscate rather than to clarify-to put
beyond discussion rather than to explain.50 To the extent that the term
is intended to embrace the rule of the people that is connoted by its
Greek root, it shares the pedigree of numerous other political ideals
based on the concept of "popular sovereignty." But to the extent that
democracy is intended to idealize the accountability of rulers to the
governed, it has no greater claim to legitimacy than Jacobinism or
Marxist-Leninism.
The legitimacy conferred by "democracy" flows not from its
recognition of the ideal of the embodiment of supreme and ultimate
authority in "the people," as it does from the legitimation of the
particular institutions that it has fashioned to shape and direct the
participation of the people in assuring that accountability. 51  In
particular, "democracy" relies on periodic elections that are grounded
on rational deliberative processes rather than on haphazard assertions
of power by the general populace, whether the latter be through mass
mobilizations, street demonstrations or union strikes. 52 Although it is
now common to layer democracy with such additional baggage as
50. The rhetorical usage amounts to little more than that we, our friends and those for
whom we have some admiration, are considered "democratic." They, the other, and those for
whom we have no respect, are not "democracies."
51. To say that democracy embodies accountability is not to say that democratic leaders
necessarily take personal responsibility for their conduct. Indeed, there is a pronounced
difference among democratic societies on the willingness of their leaders to accept such
accountability. Presidential or executive systems with fixed terms of office such as those of
the United States are notoriously adept at evading the taxing of the leaders with responsibility
for flawed policies, even as they tout their authorship of successful ones. Parliamentary
systems with collective and shared leadership such as those of the Westminster style are more
likely to accept responsibility for failed policies, but the consequences of accountability in
such cases tend to be personal rather than systemic.
52. Here, I use the term "deliberative democracy" in a more expansive sense than that in
which it is employed by contemporary political scientists. For my purposes, all that is
intended by the term is that a voter acts on the basis of considered information that is
communicated expressly for the purpose of influencing the voter's decision. For this
perspective, the reader may substitute "consideration" for "deliberation." Compare e.g.,
Joshua Cohen, Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in THE GOOD POLITY 17 (A. Hamilin
and P. Pettit eds., 1989) ("By a deliberative democracy, I shall mean, roughly, an association
whose affairs are governed by the public deliberation of its members."). This has been read by
some to require active face-to-face conversations that mimic essentially the New England
town meetings of old.
POLITICAL IDEOLOGY AS A RELIGION
"rule of law," and "human rights," these are neither intrinsic to
democracy, nor are they necessarily exclusive to "democratic
societies." They are as much post hoc rationalizations for claiming the
superiority of democracy as they are foundations for democracy. That
they are seen to be integral to democracy merely reveals the
dogmatism that now attends the concept. All that is genuinely
distinctive about democracy is that rulers and policies periodically
must be submitted to the general public for their sanction or
disapprobation.53 Beyond this feature much of what is now taken for
granted as integral to democracies-e.g., "judicial review,"
''separation of powers,' ''human rights," and "the free market," to
name some of the most conspicuously touted-are no more than
encrustations that may or may not improve upon the system.
However, even if democracy is narrowly and properly
understood for what it genuinely is, a means for periodically asserting
and for reaffirming the control of the population over their
governance, it remains a powerful legitimating tool. It assures that
rulers are made accountable for their past conduct, and it gives to the
ruled the opportunity to shape their future. The importance of these
features of government can be overstated only by ignoring the vast
history of cruelty and exploitation that preceded the emergence of
democratic rule. Indeed, the history of democracy itself shows how
grudgingly rulers acceded to being held accountable and to have those
whom they rule set the course for the future. Even after the
recognition and acceptance of the moral and legal grounding for
democratic participation in governance, the extension of that
participation was frequently confined to the most powerful members
of society. "Universal suffrage" became a more or less accepted norm
only well into the twentieth century, and even within this sphere, many
societies, including those that most vociferously trumpet their
democratic credentials, continue to find grounds for excluding
substantial swaths of their population from exercising the franchise.54
53. It should be noted here that this definition only requires periodic submission of
persons and/or policies for popular approval. Participation rates by the population in the
approbation or disapprobation process is not a factor in deciding whether a society is or is not
"democratic," although it may say a good deal about the health of the "democracy"-as is the
fact that in many contemporary "democratic societies"-including the United States-family
dynasties and other aristocratic and oligarchic structures are quite prevalent.
54. Differences on account of the criteria reflected in the title to this journal-
race/color, religion, gender, citizenship/ethnicity/nationality, have been standard bearers of
such exclusion. Cf U.S. CONST. amend. XV. In numerous societies, blood-rather than place
of birth or residence continue to dictate membership within the political community. See, e.g.,
Amartya Sen, Democracy and Its Global Roots, NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 6, 2003, at 28.
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In the United States, for example, significant members of the society,
especially black males, are prevented from having a say in how they
are governed because prisoners and ex-convicts are denied the
franchise.55  Similarly, residents of the United States, regardless of
how long they have resided here, are given no say in their governance,
or how their tax money is spent, simply because they are not
"citizens." 56
An equally substantial practical challenge to the ideal of
democracy is embedded in its theme as a deliberative or discursive
process. Precisely because democracy, if it is to function as a reliable
instrument for assuring accountability, demands intelligent
communication among participants, the necessary canvassing that it
entails can only be satisfied through large expenditures of capital and
time. The availability of capital, or at least the capacity to raise it,
creates a substantial barrier to the intelligent exercise of the franchise.
The point here is that regardless of the merits of an argument, the
intensity with which viewpoints are held, or the nature of the
community values at stake, the capacity of individuals to meaningfully
dictate their future frequently hinges on their access to capital. Despite
the frequently invoked incantation of "one man one vote," and the
egalitarian impulses of contemporary political societies, there is in fact
no necessary correlation between democracy as an abstract
proposition, and the material equality of all participants. It is hardly
surprising then that access to finance is the most influential factor in
deciding outcomes in democratic elections. Its importance is
highlighted by the pervasiveness of financially-related misfeasance-
indeed outright corruption-that has characterized the electoral
process in the much-vaunted democracies. From the United States to
the United Kingdom, France and Italy, questionable practices in the
raising and use of financial capital to obtain political power and
55. See, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Convictions and Doubts: Retribution, Representation
and the Debate over Felon Disenfranchisement, 56 STAN. L. REv. 1147 (2004).
56. But it should be noted here that this defect is not intrinsic in the concept of
democratic rule. The decisions of a polity have as much direct bearings on resident non-
citizens as they do on non-resident citizens; yet, polities differ significantly on whether to
extend the suffrage to either or both of these classes. My primary interest, however, is in the
complete exclusion of non-citizens from the suffrage, even though there are very few policies
whose effects are in fact coextensive with the political jurisdiction taking the decision. Thus,
American voters have had a good deal more to say about the lives of Iraqis in the last three
years than have Iraqis about their own lives.
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influence are firmly embedded in the structures of the "democratic
process."
57
Nor do the pedigrees of modem democracies bear out the norm
of peaceably negotiated political arrangements among pluralist
groupings. Far from it. The United Kingdom House of Commons
which, by any measure, genuinely deserves its sobriquet as "the
mother of parliaments" gained ascendancy over the governance of the
United Kingdom only after prolonged civil wars that resulted in,
among other things, the beheading of a king and the punishment of
many of those who had been involved in that "regicide." French
democracy may have its wellspring in the Revolution of 1789, but it
took the humiliation of France by Prussia in 1871 to enshrine in
practice the norms of the Revolution. And the 1789 revolution itself
was characterized less by the practice of democracy than by that of the
reign of terror, and the imposition over much of Europe of imperial
Bonapartism. Americans, of course, like to believe that theirs is the
complete and authentic democratic society with two centuries of
occasionally polluted but otherwise progressive politics behind it. But
while the country may have avoided the extreme form of the English
practice of conditioning participation in the democratic process on the
basis of property holdings, it engaged in the disenfranchisement of
significant sections of the population on other grounds, notably race
and alienage. It took a bloody civil war, and the passage of a Voting
Rights Act a full century after the end of that war, for the democratic
process in the country to approach anything that approximated fair
representation of the general population in its democratic processes
and institutions. In short, democratic participation in all of these
societies was the product of prolonged and always bloody conflict, not
the sublime enactment of moral preferences.
If the paths to democracy by these three societies were strewn
with violence and retreats, those for other societies were even less
predictable. The German experience has been in fits and starts, and
like Japan and Italy, its current form is as much the product of the
exigencies of defeat in warfare as it is of belief in the intrinsic virtues
of the democratic system. As for former colonial societies in Africa
and Asia, these states, cobbled together for the convenience of
European powers, have been expected to adopt and implement
overnight systems of governance that it took Europeans centuries of
experimentation, failure and bloodshed to fashion. Not surprisingly,
57. To invoke such names as Jack Abramoff, Peter Mandelson, Roland Dumas and
Silvio Berlusconi is only to hint at the systemic sweep of the phenomenon.
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many of them have not lived up to this expectation. 58 But rather than
empathize with their difficulties, academics, mass media pundits and
politicians, comfortably ensconced in the cocoons and redoubts of
their tenured positions or gerrymandered dynastic electoral districts,
sermonize about the inhumanities of the rulers of these societies,
proclaim democracy as the unfailing panacea for their ills, and bluntly
urge that military and economic might be deployed to bring about
democratic revolutions in those non-democratic societies. But even
the most cursory of reflections on the democratization process readily
discloses that democratic institutions emerge as an integral part of the
process by which societies create and replicate themselves. In no
society have the institutions of democratic rule emerged overnight and
independently of other social forces within that society.
These histories notwithstanding, rule by democracy is now
presented as a moral absolute. We are often asked to take entirely on
faith that democracy is a universal human right that should be imposed
through external intervention and by tanks and tomahawk missiles, if
necessary.59  Its propagation has become a necessary fall-back
justification when the original rationale for what would otherwise be
wars of aggression falters. 60  Liberal international society has
58. See, e.g., Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Law in Development: On Tapping, Gourding and
Serving Palm-Wine, 29 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 167 (1997).
59. For early academic musings on "democracy as a human right," see e.g., Franck,
supra note 44. See also Anne-Marie Burley, Law among Liberal States: Liberal
Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907 (1992); Jose E.
Alvarez, Do Liberal States Behave Better? A Critique of Slaughter's Liberal Theory, 12 EUR.
J. INT'L L. 183, 194 (2001) (noting that "we do not know for sure [whether liberal States
behave better] but there is plenty of reason to be skeptical."). See generally Fareed Zakaria,
The Rise of Illiberal Democracy, FOREIGN AFF., Nov.-Dec. 1997, at 22; SUSAN MARKS, THE
RIDDLE OF ALL CONSTITUTIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW, DEMOCRACY, AND THE CRITIQUE OF
IDEOLOGY 59 (2000). However, academic musings have ways of becoming policies when they
sanction activities that politicians find in their interest to pursue.
60. The United States now routinely offers up bringing democracy to the Arab world as
justification for its invasion of Iraq, even though this was not one of the numerous reasons
initially given for the war. Officially, those reasons had been: (i) to compel Iraqi compliance
with Security Council Resolutions; (ii) to force the destruction of "weapons of mass
destruction"; (iii) to eliminate Iraq as a source of terrorism. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of
the Press Secretary, President Bush Addresses the Nation (Mar. 19, 2003), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html.
The people of the United States and our friends and allies will not live at
the mercy of an outlaw regime that threatens the peace with weapons of
mass murder. We will meet that threat now, with our Army, Air Force,
Navy, Coast Guard and Marines, so that we do not have to meet it later
with armies of fire fighters and police and doctors on the streets of our
cities.
Id. Unofficial but otherwise acknowledged reasons included (iv) to remove the Saddam
Hussein Government as punishment for its alleged plot to kill a former President of the United
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arrogated to itself the mission of installing democratic regimes prior to
withdrawing from so-called "failed states" that it has undertaken to
reconfigure. And it maintains this position even as the history of such
interventions shows at best a poor record for effectively restructuring
such societies. 6 1 It is now a hallmark of acceptance to be certified to
have held "free and fair elections," and institutions now exist to give
or withhold this seal of approval. Receipt of the appellation of being a
"democracy" has become akin to receiving a religious sacrament. To
be declared "a democracy" is to be absolved from responsibility for
past sins, and to receive an indulgence from prospective ones. It opens
for the recipient doors into the inner sanctums of power. It assures the
flow of financial capital and preferential trade arrangements. A
country declared to be "democratic" becomes a full-fledged member
of the "international community," meaning that it can do virtually no
wrong. And so, a democratic state cannot wage unlawful wars, its
leaders do not lie, and its people do not go hungry. 63 A dogma thus
has evolved that democratic societies irrefutably are just societies in
much the same way that religionists deem their cohorts to be good.
And the flipside equally applies. A society declared to be non-
democratic is subject to being ostracized from the so-called
"international community." Its citizens are deemed to have forfeited
the right to live in peace. Economic sanctions may be imposed on it at
States; (v) to reshape the politics of the Middle-East by removing a dangerous foe to Israel;
(vi) to guarantee and secure access to an important source of crude oil. All of these focused
on the interests of external actors; unlike the now-touted promotion of "democracy," none had
at its core the promotion of the interests of ordinary Iraqis. Indeed, as President Bush
frequently reminds his listeners:
After September the 1 th, I made a commitment to the American people:
This nation will not wait to be attacked again. We will defend our
freedom. We will take the fight to the enemy. . . . There is only one
course of action against them: to defeat them abroad before they attack us
at home.
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary, President Addresses Nation, Discusses Iraq, War
on Terror (June 28, 2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/06/
print/20050628-7.html.
61. This is not the forum for developing this point, but those interested in fleshing it out
may consult the now extensive library of material on United Nations missions in Cambodia,
Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, East Timor, the Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Sierra Leone, Liberia, Afghanistan, and of course Iraq. For the articulate views of a writer
ordinarily sympathetic to so-called humanitarian intervention, see DAVID RIEFF, A BED FOR
THE NIGHT: HUMANITARIANISM IN CRISIS (2002).
62. See, e.g., BRUCE RUSSETT, GRASPING THE DEMOCRATIC PEACE: PRINCIPLES FOR A
POST-COLD WAR WORLD (1993). Compare John Norton Moore, Solving the War Puzzle, 97
AM. J. INT'L L. 282, 287-88 (2003) (arguing that "incentive theory" may provide a better
explanatory fit for the proclivity of societies to go to war).
63. See, e.g., AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM (1999).
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will, and the sufferings of the citizens can blithely be dismissed as the
fault of their "rogue" government. Similarly, such countries may be
denied rights that they otherwise have under international law by the
simple expediency of them being declared "threats to international
peace and security." Indeed, for a weak state to be portrayed as a
pariah by a powerful state has come to mean that the state in practice
forfeits any expectation that other states will protest the deprivation of
rights or privileges to which it may otherwise be entitled. Following
the Greek practice of atimia, a pariah state, thus having been
ostracized, loses the protection of the community, and may lawfully be
preyed upon by any state capable of doing so.
6 4
Since the consequence of being affirmed or denied as a
democracy is increasingly central to the status that a state possesses
within international society, it is hardly surprising that significant
disagreements exist as to whether a particular state is or is not
democratic. Thus, is Iran-a country that periodically holds
elections--democratic? Is Vladimir Putin the representative of a
"Democratic Russia," or is he but an ex-KGB apparatchik returning
Russia to the despotism of the Soviet Union? Like any fundamentalist
religion, the answer that is given typically is founded less on rigorous
analysis than in the dictates of feelings and sentiments anchored, if at
all, in the pronouncements of revered leaders. 65
But, it might be asked, why focus on the relative shortcomings
of democracy? They surely pale in contrast with those of other
possible competing political systems. And what difference does it in
fact make whether the path to democracy in the past has been strewn
with rocks? It is obviously the obligation of each generation to do the
best that it can with the resources available to it, and if the modern
contemporary "international community" has the wherewithal to
impose the democratic process on backward societies, it should do so,
should it not? And certainly, hardly anyone can, with seriousness,
claim that a non-democratic society is preferable to a democratic one;
and even in their imperfections, democratic states do a good deal more
64. On the practice of atimia, see RAPHAEL SEALEY, THE JUSTICE OF THE GREEKS 123
(1994). Within the realm of the sacred, excommunication from a church effectively serves the
same purpose. A shunned ex-member of a church loses the spiritual intercourse and succor of
the group, and may indeed be "cursed" and condemned to eternal damnation by the group. Id.
65. And so, if President Bush declares that Iraq is now a democracy by virtue of her
citizens having cast ballots under the guardianship of American tanks and armored personnel
carriers, then it surely is, while it is equally evident that Ukrainians who vote in a Kremlin-
sponsored apparatchik must have engaged in a fraudulent election, except when they vote in a
"pro-Western" president, even if the latter himself formerly had been prime minister in the
undemocratic ruling clique.
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in promoting such liberal ideals as free expression-whether of
speech, press or religion-than non-democratic ones. The remainder
of this essay is intended to confront the mind-set evident in this form
of argumentation. In what follows, I seek to demonstrate that the
close-mindedness with which the concept of democracy is now touted
is dangerously flawed for two fundamental reasons that are antithetical
to the liberal ideal. First, its origins lie in the unfortunate conflation of
power and reason. Where classical liberalism saw democracy as the
power to persuade, the idolatrous view of democracy held by
neoliberalism endorses its imposition through force and insulates its
results from rational scrutiny. Second, because the democratic process
has as its base national political communities, imbuing it with religious
iconography promotes national chauvinism that is effectively
immunized from ethical and legal scrutiny. Taken together, these
flaws undercut the indigenous creation and perpetuation of democratic
norms, and guarantee pseudo-democratic institutions for only as long
as their alien progenitors maintain the brute power on which much of
the recent attempted diffusions of democratic institutions have been
based.
V. THE DOGMATIZATION OF DEMOCRACY
The sanctification of democracy as a moral absolute and
universal creed is of remarkably recent vintage. Prior to the collapse
of the Soviet Union, democracy was but one of multiple political
ideologies that claimed to show the way for human happiness. Its
most vigorous rival was "Soviet style" Communism, but it was also in
competition with such regional ideologies as "Maoism," "Euro-
Communism," "third world nationalism," "Latin American
corporatism," "Arab nationalism," "African socialism," and
"revolutionary (or intellectual) nihilism," to name a few others. All of
these ideologies proclaimed, as their primary interest, providing in
material terms for the welfare of the general population, and only
secondarily, that of ensuring the accountability of government to the
governed. Economic welfare, rather than the purity of political
ideology or practice, provided the yardstick for measuring success.
66
66. This driving thesis of political thought prior to 1989 was forcefully argued in
CHARLES E. LINDBLOM, POLITICS AND MARKETS: THE WORLD'S POLITICAL ECONOMIC SYSTEMS
(1977).
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This state of competition among ideologies changed within a
decade. By 2000, no one seemed to doubt that there was but one path
to human happiness, and that lay through democratic governance. In
the academic world, democracy was offered as the only legitimate
philosophical offspring of the enlightenment era.6 7 The argument was
buttressed by at best dubious claims of democratic determinism in
which we were assured that democratic societies were by nature
pacifists, and certainly did not wage war against each other.68 It was
also clearly the case that democratic societies had proved themselves
much better at delivering economic wealth to their citizens. The
European Union was specimen "A" on this point, and the mass
abandonment of communism for democratic institutions by East
67. See, e.g., FRANCIS FUKIYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). In
his more recent writing, Prof. Fukiyama has qualified this conviction, asserting that, "'The
End of History,' . . . presented a kind of Marxist argument for the existence of a long-term
process of social evolution, but one that terminates in liberal democracy rather than
communism," while complaining that
interpret[ing] my book "The End of History and the Last Man" (1992) as a
neoconservative tract, one that argued in favor of the view that there is a
universal hunger for liberty in all people that will inevitably lead them to
liberal democracy, and that we are living in the midst of an accelerating,
transnational movement in favor of that liberal democracy . . . [is a]
misreading of the argument.
Francis Fukiyama, After Neoconservatism, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2006, at 62. The distinction
between the accepted thesis and the qualification is at best metaphysical, seemingly depending
on the connection between individualized yearning at a given time and place and the
inevitability of the product of the yearning. Can one really have the latter without the former?
68. See RuSSETT, supra note 62; Moore, supra note 62. Prof. Moore would limit the
claim to "wars" involving more than 1000 dead. Id. at 282. This qualification conveniently
eliminates the numerous "landings of marines" by the United States in Latin America and
elsewhere. See MAx BOOT, THE SAVAGE WARS OF PEACE: SMALL WARS AND THE RISE OF
AMERICAN POWER (2002). However, even this arbitrary qualification falls in the face of the
invasion and occupation of Iraq. Indeed, as Stephen Kinzer has amply documented,
unprovoked war and regime change in support of U.S. domestic interests has been the rule
rather than the exception in U.S. foreign policy over the last century, and this policy of
belligerence may well receive support precisely because United States politicians have
internalized democratic norms as rendering them answerable solely to their domestic
constituencies. See STEPHEN KINZER, OVERTHROW: AMERICA'S CENTURY OF REGIME CHANGE
FROM HAWAII TO IRAQ (2006). See also ANDREW J. BACEVICH, THE NEW AMERICAN
MILITARISM (2004). A much more plausible argument is that democracies are less likely to
wage prolonged wars because the costs of such wars sooner or later must be borne by the
population. What distinguishes democracies from non-democratic societies is thus less their
propensity to go to war, as their relative incapacity to engage in protracted wars or wars of
attrition. The consequence may well be that democracies are more likely to engage in "total"
war, that is warfare that permits the use of all available means in order to terminate the war as
promptly as possible. Indeed, in the United States, this has come to be called the "Powell
Doctrine." See generally Michiko Kakutani, Tracing Colin Powell's Journey, Both In and Out
of Step With Those Around Him, NY TIMES, Oct. 10, 2006, at E9 (reviewing KAREN
DEYOUNG, SOLDIER: THE LIFE OF COLIN POWELL (2006)).
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European societies was further evidence. The value of voluntary
choice, its seemingly counterintuitive capacity for accommodation of
competing interests and their effective coordination through the
availability of exit mechanisms were readily analogized to the equally
counterintuitive effectiveness of the market mechanism operating
through the "invisible hand. 69 Ostensibly depoliticized international
civil servants such as the Secretary-General of the United Nations have
joined the parade, thereby giving it a nonideological conventional
cast.70
Had the preference for democracy been restricted to arguments
among scholars and politicians about its efficacy, one could hardly
complain. There are indeed good reasons for believing in the
superiority of the democratic process over competing possibilities. On
its face, democracy is a flexible instrument of governance that, at least
in the abstract, subjects rulers to account to the ruled. It is certainly
consistent with classical liberalism's ideal of governance through
consent. But classical liberalism's privileging of consent entails a
belief in the efficacy of persuasion rather than its entrenchment
through coercion. It assumes that a worthwhile ideology is one that
individuals and societies come to embrace through reason rather than
because they are compelled to do so through force. That has not been
the history for the spread of democracy over the last decade and-a-half.
Democracy has been promoted as a dogma primarily through
economic and military coercion. The process occurs in three stages.
In the first, a benign formulation of the dogma is decreed by fiat.
Next, the dogma is enforced through a mixture of coercive measures
and appeal to the enlightened interest of the party against whom
enforcement takes place. Finally, the elements of the dogma are
gradually redefined to accord with the particularized interests of its
69. The seminal reflection on the analogy of the mechanisms of choice in the economic
and political arenas, and which continue to inform contemporary thinking is ALBERT O.
HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS,
AND STATES (1970).
70. See, e.g., Kofi A. Annan, Democracy as an International Issue, 8 GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE 135 (2002). As he said while accepting the 2001 Nobel Peace prize:
[T]he lesson of the past century has been that where the dignity of the
individual has been trampled or threatened, where citizens have not
enjoyed the basic right to choose their government or the right to change it
regularly, conflict has too often followed, with innocent civilians paying
the price in lives cut short and communities destroyed.
Kofi Annan, Secretary-Gen. of the U.N., Remember This Girl, Nobel Lecture at the
Presentation of the Award of the Centennial Nobel Peace Prize (Dec. 10, 2001), in 39 U.N.
CHRON. 4, Mar. 1, 2002, available at http://www.un.org/Pubs/chronicle/20021issuel/
0102p4.html.
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promulgators. By the third stage, the legitimation process is complete,
and the cost of questioning whether the dogma should in fact be a
norm has been put beyond discussion.
The purported lessons that were to be learned from the collapse
of the Soviet Union initiated the first stage in the transformation of
democracy from a preferred ideal to an entrenched dogma. In a
seminal work, Francis Fukuyama argued that with that collapse,
human society had arrived at the end of its prolonged quest for the
perfect society. 71  Taking a cue from the Marxist methodology of
material determinism (itself, in the not-too-distant past an example of a
philosophical dogma that in its zeal and faith paralleled those of any
religion), Fukuyama, speaking for many, contended that the
democratic ethos sweeping through Central and Eastern Europe
represented the culmination of civilization's inexorable drift to liberal
individualism.72
The move from the embrace of a philosophical ideal to its
forceful imposition on a society is almost always facilitated by the
existence on the ground of chaotic conditions, with the ideal offered up
as a practical alternative. In a Panglossian world, a communal spirit
would reign supreme and the members of the community acting for the
benefit of the whole would collaboratively work to transform an ideal
or vision into an ordered society. 73 History however suggests that the
more common reality is that the ideal typically is made real either by a
self-confident activist minority, or by external intervention.74  The
disintegration of the Soviet empire and the withdrawal of Soviet
Russia's Cold War support to several weak governments in the third
world created chaotic conditions in many of these societies. In the
resulting civil strife in the Balkans and much of Africa, liberal
democracy offered a way out. In some instances, internal groups were
able to effectively generate the institutions of liberal democracy. But
this entailed plodding messy politics that operated in fits and starts,
71. See FUKIYAMA, THE LAST MAN AND THE END OF HISTORY, supra note 67.
72. See id. Anchoring his analysis in less deterministic terms, Samuel P. Huntington
nonetheless observed a similar drift in much of the rest of the non-Western world, what he
termed the "third wave" of democratization. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE THIRD WAVE
(1991).
73. The American Revolution, which, although born in bloodshed, went on to develop
strong institutional democratic foundations in a revered federal Constitution, is often presented
as an illustration of this possibility, and especially so in the sharp contrast that it presents to
the reign of terror and the emergence of Napoleonic despotism that followed the
contemporaneous French Revolution.
74. The 1917 Bolshevik revolution is perhaps the best known example of the former,
while the effort to spread the French Revolution between 1794-1801 best represents the latter.
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and sometimes resulted in bloodshed. For societies that were large,
reasonably well-endowed in material resources, or that commenced the
process prior to 1992, these internal forces were allowed to play
themselves out.75 By 1992, however, this was no longer a tenable
path.
The successful ejection of Iraq from Kuwait by a United
States-led transcontinental coalition of forces in 1991, a newly-found
assertiveness of the Security Council acting under Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter, and the transformation of the hitherto
European Economic Community into a forceful political institution,
brought into play what was popularly referred to as a "new world
order. ' '76  "Liberal democracy" under the banner of "humanitarian
intervention" was the creed of the order, but more importantly, the
creed could be enforced by societies and institutions with the
commitment to do so. Somalia presented the first opportunity, but its
ignominious failure was seen not as challenging the basic policy, but
the means of its implementation. This view was reinforced by the
horrendous consequences of the failure of any of these international
institutions to avert the genocidal catastrophe in Rwanda. When
United Nations action in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995 led to a peace
accord, the new doctrine empowering external actors to restructure the
internal politics of societies seemed to have received its practical
confirmation. In short order, the "international community"
discovered it had an obligation to intervene and bring peace to
societies as diverse in their internal geopolitics as Haiti, East
Timor/Indonesia, Iraq/Kurdistan, Kosovo, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, to name a few others. There
was no longer any issue beyond the capacity of the United Nations
Security Council to declare a "threat to international peace and
security." And local populations were no longer considered capable of
resolving their own conflicts. Thus, driven by a few outrageous
demonstrations of humanity's capacity to engage in barbaric behavior
towards even the closest of kin, "humanitarian intervention" was
deployed to legitimize the selective intervention of big powers in the
processes of state disintegration and reformation across the globe. In
75. The primary examples of this phenomenon were the large Central and East
European states that had been part of the Soviet sphere, notably Poland, Hungary, the former
Czechoslovakia and Rumania. Outside of this bloc, the Philippines, Brazil, Argentina and
Chile illustrate the point. The Republic of South Africa, although sui generis, in many ways
can be made to fit within this pattern.
76. The zeitgeist is captured well in ROBERT KAGAN, OF PARADISE AND POWER:
AMERICA AND EUROPE IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2003).
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all of these, creating democracy (or perhaps more accurately, imposing
it) was asserted as an unimpeachable goal.
Routinely employing economic sanctions and military force,
the new order jettisoned the post World War I conventional wisdom
that national polities should be given substantial leeway in the framing
of their national societies. 77 The new sacred text would be secure only
by overthrowing the old, which had explicitly abjured external
intervention as amounting to interference with the political
independence and territorial integrity of a state. 78 Between 1995-2001,
the intellectual history of international relations was primarily that of
demonstrating the claimed incoherence of a political, philosophical or
legal regime grounded on "sovereignty." 79 Proponents of the new test
glamorized the new-found universal solidarity of democracies in such
disparate fields as human rights, gender equality, and the environment.
This universal solidarity existed primarily for the purpose of
legitimizing the right of those in liberal democracies to chastise the
laggards. Academics, journalists and politicians were all too willing to
demonstrate how certain non-democratic societies were far short of
these norms. For these critiques, what counted was some universal
standard, which as it often turned out amounted to little more than
what they thought ought to be the standard. Thus, flogging or other
corporal punishment was a violation of the standard, but the death
penalty was not. Customary International Law, which allegedly
spelled out the do's and don'ts of the new religion of democracy,
turned out to be little more than what publicists asserted it to be, or
succeeded in persuading a municipal court judge that it was.80
International economic arrangements were even more telling
refutations of the existence of a universal solidarity. The creation of
the World Trade Organization in 1994 on its face paralleled the
universalization phenomenon of the "New World Order," and there is
little doubt that many of the same political conditions that fomented
that order contributed to the structure of the organization. In
particular, the effort to judicialize the process of dispute resolution
77. This conventional wisdom, which was seen as the cornerstone of the doctrine of
"sovereignty," had been enshrined in U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
78. U.N. Charter art. 2, paras. 4 & 7.
79. See, e.g., MICHAEL Ross FOWLER & JULIE M. BUNCK, LAW, POWER, AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATE: THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY
(1995); STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY (1999); PROBLEMATIC
SOVEREIGNTY: CONTESTED RULES AND POLITICAL POSSIBILITIES (Stephen D. Krasner ed.,
2001).
80. See, e.g., Maxwell 0. Chibundu, Making Customary International Law through
Municipal Adjudication: A Structural Inquiry, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1069 (1999).
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through binding arrangements reflected the dominant roles that the
European Economic Community and the United States place on this
mechanism. 8' But the selection of the economic arenas that were to be
regulated under the new regime, and the specifications of the terms of
the regulation, reflected the reality that, however valid the intellectual
arguments for a liberal and universal free trade arrangement, the
politics of trade remained firmly rooted in domestic pressure groups
and interests. 82  The "rights" of the holders of intellectual property
were given universal recognition, but agricultural producers were left
to fend for themselves, with the result being that farmers in the
industrialized countries received a good deal of benefit from the
noninterference of the international system with the substantial
subsidies they received from their governments, while farmers in
export-oriented poor countries continued to be significantly
disadvantaged under the system.8 3 Beyond the WTO, the concept of a
"universal" commercial system was turned on its head. Regional
arrangements proliferated and by far the most common commercial
arrangement among societies is "bilateral": an arrangement that far
from enshrining international solidarity, typically permitted the
stronger state to exploit its strength to the disadvantage of the weaker
state. In short, in the economic arena-as in the political-the idea of
democracy as a norm of solidarity proved to be predominantly
notional.
But the most striking element in the elevation of democracy to
a universal norm has been an omission: the complete failure to define
the criteria for individual membership and participation in the political
community that is envisioned. The apostles of universalism trumpeted
the rights that states owed to individuals within the political
81. See, e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, The Limits of Litigation: Americanization and Negotiation
in the Settlement of WTO Disputes, 19 OH. ST. J. ON Disp. RES. 121 (2003); Scott McBride,
Dispute Settlement in the WTO: Backbone of the Global trading System or Delegation of
Awesome Power?, 32 L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 643 (2001).
82. See, e.g., SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW: THE GLOBALIZATION OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS (2003); CARLOS MARIA CORREA, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
RIGHTS: THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT AND POLICY
OPTIONS (2000).
83. For a comprehensive discussion of the regulation of agriculture under international
trade law, see MELAKU G. DESTA, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN AGRICULTURAL
PRODUCTS: FROM GATT 1947 TO THE WTO AGREEMENT ON AGRICULTURE (2002). For
scrutiny on the WTO and the claims of developing countries for more equitable treatment in
the regulation of the trade in agricultural products, see, e.g., Karen H. Cross, King Cotton,
Developing Countries and the 'Peace Clause': WTO's US Cotton Subsidy Decision, 9 J. INT'L
ECON. L. 149 (2006); Carmen G. Gonzalez, Institutionalizing Inequality: The WTO Agreement
on Agriculture, Food Security and Developing Countries, 27 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 433 (2002).
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community, but have been entirely silent about the right of the
individual to shape the new-fangled universal society. The right of the
individual has remained essentially that which she had by virtue of
being the citizen of a state. Democracy assured her the right to shape
the affairs of her state, but her capacity to influence the affairs of the
universal community depended completely on the place of her state
within the international system. The shortcomings of this incomplete
theorizing of the universal democratic order have been most evident in
the failure to confront the issue of migrant labor. The European Union
recognized the problem and partially confronted it, but even its own
framework has remained firmly within the concept of national
citizenship. 84  Elsewhere, even as the concept of "civil society" is
touted as a unifying transnational movement, the rights of the migrant
in her daily life remains totally embedded in the much-maligned
institution of state sovereignty. This is what can fairly be termed the
"citizenship deficit," and the extent of its ramifications for a world
order based on democracy was laid bare with the responses of the
United States to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the symbols of its
military and economic might.
Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks on the Pentagon and
the World Trade Center, proponents of democracy as a universal norm
could, at least with some plausibility, argue that the claim was
motivated by a desire for the equal treatment of all individuals
according to the Aristotelian maxim of each according to her desert.
85
States within the international system may not be uniformly endowed,
but the operation of the democratic norm does not depend on equality
of results as long as each similarly situated individual within each
society was subjected to the same procedural treatment, and given the
same opportunity to express her individuality. In such an
environment, the democratic norm functioned to accord the respect of
dignity to which each and every individual is naturally entitled. This
argument loses much of its force in the wake of the responses of
several liberal democratic societies to the September 11 events. These
societies and their governments have demonstrated a propensity to
employ force and minimal resort to legality in waging a so-called
global war on terrorism. Practices that not too long ago were deemed
84. Thus, although citizens of nation-states of the European Union ordinarily may seek
employment in any territory within the Union, participation in the political life of member
states continues to be determined on grounds of national citizenship. See generally JEFF
KENNER, EU EMPLOYMENT LAW: FROM ROME TO AMSTERDAM AND BEYOND 12 (2003).
85. See generally Aristotle, Nickomachian Ethics, in THE BASIC WORKS OF ARISTOTLE
(Richard McKeon ed., 1941).
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to be taboo, and which were almost uniformly condemned, are now
routinely employed and sometimes defended as essential to winning
the war. Government-sanctioned assassinations, 86 other forms of
extrajudicial killings, 87  torture and inhumane treatment, 88  the
unreviewable rounding up and indefinite detentions of whole groups of
persons,89 and the outright disappearance of persons into untraceable
black holes of the administrative state have become accepted tools of
the war.9° Even where democratic governments resort to law as a tool
in this war, the applicable legal regime at best has been corrupted to
achieve desired results. Mere affiliation with undesirable groups,
speech that is deemed as "inciting" or "glorifying" terrorism, is
routinely outlawed and punished. 91 The administrative freezing of
personal assets, if governed at all, is at best under the most Kafkaesque
of rules. And where judicial proceedings have been made available to
those charged with crime, they have been substantially curtailed.
92
86. See, e.g., David Johnston & David E. Sanger, Threats and Responses: Hunt for
Suspects; Fatal Strike in Yemen Was Based on Rules Set Out by Bush, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6,
2002, at A16; James Risen & David Johnston, Threats and Reponses: Hunt for Al Qaeda;
Bush Has Widened Authority of C.IA. to Kill Terrorists, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 2002, at 1.
87. A common refrain is to "kill" or "capture" an alleged terrorist, with the "capture"
almost always added as an afterthought. The killings may be contracted out to private bounty
hunters. President Bush could thus offer 25 million dollars for Osama bin Laden "dead or
alive." Not surprisingly, executing the foreign head of state is simply another tool of war.
The United States government began the 2003 war with Iraq by blowing up a building where,
erroneously as is more often the case than not, its intelligence indicated Mr. Saddam Hussein
was present. The result was the killing of many unintended victims, so-called "collateral
damage."
88. Visual images of the treatment of persons detained at the Abu Ghraib prison in Iraq,
while the most notorious examples, are far from being unique. Entire bookshelves can now be
filled with reports and debates over the use of torture and allied treatments in connection with
the war on terrorism. See, e.g., MARK DANNER, TORTURE AND TRUTH: AMERICA, ABU
GHRAIB, AND THE WAR ON TERROR (2004); THE TORTURE DEBATE IN AMERICA (Karen
Greenberg ed., 2006); SANFORD LEVINSON, TORTURE: A COLLECTION (2004); ANTONIO
TAGUBA, TAGUBA REPORT ON TREATMENT OF ABU GHRAIB PRISONERS IN IRAQ (2004).
89. The detentions of persons on Guantanamo Bay are, of course, the best known but by
no means only example of this phenomenon. Other democracies, including the United
Kingdom and France have explicitly adopted policies of prolonged and secretive detentions of
non-citizens. Compare A and Others v. Secretary of State for the Home Department, 2004
UKHL 56 (H.L. 2004).
90. See, e.g., Craig Whitlock, Europeans Investigate CIA Role in Abductions: Suspects
Possibly Taken to Nations that Torture, WASH. POST, Mar. 13, 2005, at Al; Dana Priest, CIA
Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2005, at Al.
91. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1456, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1456 (Jan. 20, 2003). In the United
States, a life imprisonment sentence has been imposed on a Muslim preacher for "making a
series of speeches that prosecutors contended-and a jury found-incited his followers to train
for war against the United States." See Sentenced for Speaking, WASH. POST, Jul. 17, 2005, at
B6.
92. In the United States, for example, the use of so-called "Military Commissions" to
"try" alleged "enemy combatants" for being members of a "terrorist" outfit stands as a glaring
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And in all of these cases, citizenship has been the decisive determinant
of the treatment the individual is given.93  Aside from the quite
predictable stance of the executive branch, courts and legislatures have
determined that citizenship should determine the process available to
those caught up in the dragnet of the "war" on terrorism.
94
VI. CITIZENSHIP, DEMOCRACY AND THE UNIVERSAL IDEAL
The claim of universal brotherhood (and sisterhood) is
common to virtually all major religions, and in a genuine sense, most
of them do in fact draw their membership from across the globe. The
two largest, Christianity and Islam, not only engage extensively in
proselytization, but also go out of their way to portray themselves as
denationalized communities. Both membership and leadership in
Islam are highly decentralized, and no hierarchy within Islam claims
ultimate authority to decide eligibility of membership, let alone
leadership over other Muslim groups. The Roman Catholic and
Anglican churches, the two most hierarchically organized of the
Christian denominations, while retaining much of the vestiges of their
anchor in the state culture of Western Europe, nonetheless increasingly
draw not simply their membership, but also their leadership,
transnationally. In claiming universal representativeness, these
illustration of the travesty of judicial process. But the perversion of the process goes further.
As an element of the so-called "global war on terrorism," persons are routinely "lawfully"
arrested as "material witnesses"-the basic right of an accused person to "confront" a witness
has been greatly vitiated in the name of "national security." See, e.g., U.S. v. Moussaoui, 365
F.3d 292 (4th Cir. 2004) amended by 382 F.3d 453 (4th Cir. 2004). Moreover, the
government views the game as a "heads I win tails you lose" proposition. Thus, it accepted as
vindication the willingness of a Virginia jury to convict solely on the basis of reported speech
the association of an imam with terrorism, but in response to the acquittal of a Palestinian-born
professor from similar charges, again proffered solely on the basis of speech, it has threatened
to deport this stateless academic to any country that would accept him. See Sentenced for
Speaking, supra note 23; Jerry Markon, Muslem Anger Bums over Lingering Probe of
Charities, WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2006, at B 1.
93. See, e.g., Katrin Bennhold, Europe, Too, Takes Harder Line in Handling Terrorism
Suspects, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2006, at AI.
94. Justice Scalia's contrasting positions in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554
(2004), and Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 488-489 (2004) illustrate the point. While asserting
that the outcome in both cases should be controlled by a textual interpretation of the
Constitution of the United States, and while seemingly acknowledging that the Constitution on
its face does not differentiate between the "citizen" and "non-citizen" with regard to the right
of habeas corpus, he nonetheless finds that a non-citizen may be denied such a right even
where the citizen would not. The United States Congress has followed up on this suggestion,
and in the Detainees' Detention Act, it has explicitly limited the right of non-citizens held on
Guantanamo Bay to challenge their detention. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e) (2005).
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institutions can demonstrate that the ties that bind derive from spiritual
affinity rather than the fortuity of birth.
The same can hardly be said of the universalism of
contemporary neoliberals. The state remains the cornerstone for
individual identity, and membership in the so-called "international
community" is distinctly different for a citizen of Uganda than it is for
a citizen of the United States. The latter is guaranteed the possibility
of being President of the World Bank, the former absolutely need not
apply.9  Other leadership positions within the international system,
such as those of Secretary-General of the United Nations, Director-
General of the International Monetary Fund, and Supreme Commander
of the Armed Forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, are
determined by nationality. And, of course, who gets to be the most
powerful man (and, sometime in the future, perhaps woman as well) is
solely the prerogative of possessing a United States passport.
As noninstinctual as it may appear, liberalism does not compel
awarding national citizenship the trump card that it currently has in the
international arena. That such familiar concepts in national discourse
as "merit" and "multiculturalism" have not become part of the
vocabulary of neoliberalism is a testimonial to the undertheorized
nature of the claim for democracy as a universal norm. It also
highlights the contingent basis for the claim, rooted as it is in the
material wealth and military might of the societies that seek to
propagate it. But if the hypocrisy or, as some would rather have it,
"judicious double standard," of preaching universality while actively
discriminating on account of citizenship involved only what Isaiah
Berlin termed "positive liberties,' 96 one might simply dismiss it as
hard luck. 97 Material resources are indeed finite, and to the extent that
a state must discriminate among beneficiaries of its resources, its
95. This permanent disability from participation in the national life of a country on
account of the assigned citizenship of the individual should be contrasted with the recent
elevation of a Ugandan born Anglican to the second most-influential bishopric in the Anglican
Church, putting him potentially in line to become the spiritual leader of the Church of
England. See Profile: Archbishop John Sentamu, BBC NEWS, Nov. 30, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uklgo/pr/fr/-/2/hi/uk-news/4102960.stm. As the election of a Polish pope
and his German successor indicate, the hierarchy of the Roman Catholic Church meaningfully
has become denationalized.
96. See ISAIAH BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY: INCORPORATING FOUR
ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166 (Henry Hardy ed., 2nd ed. 2003).
97. For a defense of conduct that might appear to some as "hypocritical," but to others
as "judicious double standards," see, e.g., Richard Cohen, Judicious Double Standards, WASH.
POST, Mar. 17, 2006, at A17 ("The cry of 'double standard' is a bit silly. It asks us not to
recognize certain realities-the difference between friends and enemies, for instance, or good
and bad democracies, to give another example.").
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choice of national citizenship is certainly owed deference if not
applause. But citizenship has come to be decisive not only in the
award of licenses, or entitlement to employment positions, but in the
distribution of "negative liberties" as well. It is here that democracy
even in its idealized form is subject to severe criticism.
The mystique of the democratic process rests on the
"sovereignty of the people." But who are the people that are
sovereign? The standard answer today is the "citizen." And who is a
citizen? History suggests three possible conceptual answers that are
grounded on the relationship of the individual to the state, each is in its
own way mystical.
In the pre-industrial or feudal age, the "citizen" (or more
accurately, "subject") was one who paid obeisance to her lord. The
relationship was primarily one of certifying identity. The inhabitant of
a territory existed in a spiritual or quasi-spiritual relationship to the
territory and its ruler. The feudal liege used that certification as the
basis for compelling service to the lord. In dethroning feudalism,
classical liberalism converted territorial certification to territorial
participation. Citizenship now represented not mere membership
within a fixed geographical space, but participation in the governance
of the territory. Thus, in both the French and American revolutions,
the concept of the citizen was based on the contribution of the
individual to self-governance rather than on loyalty to a sovereign, or
benefits to be derived from the state. This harkened back to the Greek
concept of citizenship.
In the "rights" (or "postmodern") age, citizenship has taken on
an additional characteristic: the moral and legal grounding for the
assertion of claims against the state. This additional function is related
to the emergence of the state as more than a spiritual and an
administrative entity. Even more substantially, the state has come to
be the provider of social and economic welfare. The ensuing
concentration of economic and regulatory powers within the institution
of the state has given it a central distributive role, and with it, the need
to classify and to apply rigidly the distinction between the "citizen"
and the non-citizen. Were the force of this classification to be limited
to those instances in which it matters-that is, for administrative
purposes, for the distribution of economic goods or even for quasi-
sanctification reasons such as flag-waving-the discrimination would
not only be comprehensible but perhaps morally justifiable as well.
But the Neoliberal treatment of the dichotomy has gone a good deal
further. As already explained, it now also embraces criteria for
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determining who may legally be detained indefinitely without judicial
process, or indeed whose life may be snuffed out without
accountability.
In reposing the legitimation of the contemporary state in
democratic participation by citizens, and in continuing to anchor the
concept of citizenship in territorial affiliation and subjection (or, if you
prefer "loyalty") to the state or "pater," neoliberalism has in fact
returned to the feudal conception of the relationship of the individual
to society. But for the non-citizen, the consequence may be worse
than it was for the feudal serf. The feudal lord had a religiously
infused moral obligation to extend protection to the powerless serf. In
the rights-driven modem environment where positive law now defines
the boundaries of the relationship between the individual and society,
the non-citizen may well be in a worse position. Not being a citizen
has become tantamount to not being a being.
VII. CONCLUSION
The liberal political perspective is often seen as a counterpoint
to religious belief. Where the latter is typically portrayed as
reflexively dogmatic, the former generally is presented as the paragon
of dynamic reasoning and compromise. Contemporary political order
and thought do not justify these contrasting images. "Democracy" has
become as barren an invocation of unexamined faith as any religious
dogma. There are good practical reasons for promoting democratic
societies, but it is dangerous to sanctify any ideology on the basis of
the potential good that it may harbor. Political institutions are always
forged in the exigencies of human experience, and this is no less the
case with democracy than it is with other political ideologies. This
demands commitment to a vigilance underpinned by constant inquiries
and modifications, not a smug worshipful incantation of the blessings
of democracy. In deifying democracy, contemporary liberal societies
run the risk of insulating the practice from the scrutiny that it deserves.
When a practice is vested with divine goodness, it is bound to turn into
a dictatorship. That is neither in the interest of liberalism, nor of the
billions of people for whom the search for the optimal means of
governance remains a vital challenge.
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